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This note shows that the first-price auction fully implements efficient investments
when agents make not only ex ante but also ex post investments. The essential assump-
tions of our model are that (i) each agent can invest before and after participating in
the auction under the same cost function and (ii) the cost functions are common knowl-
edge among agents. In any equilibrium of our model, the most efficient agent always
wins and makes the efficient level of investment.
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1 Introduction
In the literature of auction theory, a number of papers have examined the ex ante investment
incentives in the auction mechanisms (Tan, 1992; Piccione and Tan, 1996; Arozamena and
Cantillon, 2004). Our companion paper Tomoeda (2017) analyzes full implementability of
efficient investments in the general framework of mechanism design. The main result of
Tomoeda (2017) is that a novel concept commitment-proofness is sufficient and necessary for
fully implementing efficient investments when ex post investment is possible and the social
choice function is allocatively efficient. One limitation of this theorem, however, is that we
cannot apply it to allocatively inefficient mechanisms, which include an important class of
mechanisms: asymmetric first-price auctions (FPA).
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In this note, we show that the first-price auction implements efficient investments in any
perfect Bayesian equilibrium when agents can invest ex post as well as ex ante. In particular,
we show that only one agent whose investment is most efficient will actually invest in any
equilibrium of our model. We consider a single-item and private-value auction. Investment
is modeled as a choice of (a distribution of) private valuations of the item, which makes the
first-price auction naturally asymmetric. The timeline of the game is as follows. First, each
agent simultaneously chooses a distribution over the valuations of the item, and the valuation
is drawn from the distribution. Then, each agent participates in the first-price auction with
the knowledge of her own valuation and the distributions of all other agents’ valuations. After
the outcome of the auction is determined, agents can make further investments. Technically,
we apply the equilibrium characterization results of Maskin and Riley (2000, 2003).
2 Model
Let I ≡ {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of agents. The set of alternatives is defined by Ω ≡ {ωi}i∈I .
For each agent i ∈ I, alternative ωi means that i obtains the item. The valuation ai of the
item for each i ∈ I is in an interval [0, αi] where αi ∈ R+.
Agents can make investments to change their own private valuations. Let Fi be the set of
cumulative distribution functions of valuations which can be chosen as an ex ante investment
by agent i. Let F ≡ ×i∈IFi. We assume that Fi includes all cumulative distribution functions




i ] of Fi is in [0, αi], (ii)





and (iv) F i(aFii ) > 0.
The cost of investment is defined in the following way. For each agent i ∈ I, the cost of
deterministic investment ai ∈ [0, αi] is given by a cost function ci : [0, αi] → R+. ci(·) satisfies
the following conditions: (i) ci(0) = 0, (ii) ci(·) is twice continuously differentiable, (iii)
c′i(ai) > 0 for any ai ∈ [0, αi], (iv) c′′i (ai) > 0 for any ai ∈ [0, αi], and (v) c′i(αi) = 1.1 Since ex
ante investment can be a distribution over valuations, the cost of each uncertain investment






1If we do not assume condition (v), we need some more specific conditions on c′′i (·) to ensure the existence
of a Bayesian equilibrium in FPA following Maskin and Riley (2000, 2003). Moreover, under those conditions,
we can show that no valuation a with c′i(a) > 1 is chosen in equilibrium anyway. Therefore, we just assume
condition (v) to focus on investment choices a with c′i(a) ≤ 1, and avoid other specific assumptions on c′′i (·).
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If agent i increases her valuation from ai ∈ [0, αi] to ãi ∈ [ai, αi] after the auction stage,
the cost of ex post investment that i incurs is ci(ãi)− ci(ai). Although investments may be
uncertain, we assume that the cost functions {ci(·)}i∈I and {αi}i∈I are common knowledge
among agents.
We assume that investment is irreversible, i.e., if the pre-auction valuation is ai, then the
agent can only choose a new valuation from [ai, αi] ex post. The timeline of the investment
game and the informational assumption are summarized as follows:
1. Each agent i ∈ I simultaneously chooses a distribution Fi ∈ Fi. (Fi)i∈I is observable
to all agents. The valuation ai ∈ [0, αi] of the item is drawn from Fi for each agent i.
2. Agents participate in the first-price auction. Each agent i knows her own valuation ai,
but does not know the realizations of other agents’ valuations (aj)j∈I\{i}.
3. After the auction is run, each agent may make an additional investment. That is, agent
i can choose a valuation ãi from [ai, αi].
3 Investments in the First-Price Auction
In the first-price auction, each agent submits a non-negative sealed bid bi ∈ R+. The bidder
with the highest bid wins and pays her own bid. If two or more bids tie, we use the Vickrey
tie-breaking rule, in which each agent submits a non-negative sealed tie-breaker ti ∈ R+. If
more than one bidders tie with a bid bi, the bidder i with the highest tie-breaker among
them wins, and she pays bi + maxj∈I\{i}{tj|bj = bi}. If there is a tie for the highest tie-
breaker, we randomize among those who make this bid with equal probability. The Vickrey
tie-breaking rule plays a crucial role in ensuring the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium in
FPA.2 Let w : R2n+ → 2I × {0, 1} represent the set of bidders whose bids are highest and










{tj|j ∈ arg max
i∈I
{bi}}, 1) if | arg max
i∈I
{bi}| ≥ 2,
where b ≡ (b1, ..., bn) and t ≡ (t1, ..., tn).
For each agent i ∈ I, a strategy is defined by (Fi, (βF̃i )F̃∈F , ãi). Fi ∈ Fi is the choice




i ] → ∆(R2+) is the (mixed) bidding strategy (which also
2See the proof of Theorem 1 and footnote 4 for more details.
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specifies the tie-breaker) for each profile of distributions F̃ ∈ F . ãi : [0, αi] × Ω → [0, αi]
is the ex post investment strategy which satisfies ãi(ai, ω) ∈ [ai, αi] for any ai ∈ [0, αi] and
ω ∈ Ω. For any profile of (on-path) strategies (F, βF , ã), the interim utility uFPAi (F, ai, βF , ã)
for each realized valuation ai is defined as
uFPAi (F, ai, β






















ãi(ai, ωi)− bi − max
j∈I\{i}




























The ex ante utility UFPAi (F, β
F , ã) is defined by taking the expectation of the interim utility
with respect to ai and subtracting the cost of ex ante investment:
UFPAi (F, β
F , ã) ≡ −γcii (Fi) +
∫ αi
0
uFPAi (F, ai, β
F , ã)dFi(ai).
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is defined in the following way.
Definition 1. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the first-price auction with an investment
game is a profile of strategies (F, (βF̃ )F̃∈F , ã) that satisfies the following conditions:
1. For each i ∈ I, the ex post investment strategy ãi : [0, αi]× Ω → [0, αi] satisfies






ãi(ai, ωj) = ai for any j ̸= i
for each ai ∈ [0, αi].




i ] → ∆(R2+) satisfies











for each ai ∈ [aF̃ii , a
F̃i
i ] given other agents’ bidding strategies β
F̃
−i.
3. For each i ∈ I, the choice of cumulative distribution function Fi ∈ Fi satisfies
Fi ∈ arg max
F̂i∈Fi
UFPAi ((F̂i, F−i), β
(F̂i,F−i), ã)
given other agents’ choices F−i ∈ F−i.
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As required by Maskin and Riley (2003), we assume that agents never bid strictly higher
than their own reservation prices at the auction stage. That is, if agent i’s realized valuation
is ai, her bid is at most b
ci(ai) ≡ maxa∈[ai,αi]{a− (ci(a)− ci(ai))}.
We say that the first-price auction with an investment game achieves full efficiency in
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the equilibrium achieves efficiency in both allocations and
investments.
Definition 2. The first-price auction with an investment game achieves full efficiency in a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium (F, (βF̃ )F̃∈F , ã) if the following conditions are satisfied:



















(bn, tn)d(bn, tn) > 0,
then































Note that we do not need to require conditions on the ex post investment strategy ã
because it is always socially optimal in equilibrium.
Our main result is that the first-price auction with an investment game always achieves
full efficiency in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In particular, only one of the agents
with lowest cost functions invests and no other agents make positive investments in any
equilibrium.
Theorem 1. The first-price auction with an investment game achieves full efficiency in any
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. Let bci(ai) be i’s reservation price in the auction stage when ai is drawn ex ante.








= αi − ci(αi) + ci(ai).
From our assumptions on ci(·), bci(·) is twice continuously differentiable and (bci)′(ai) > 0
for any ai ∈ [0, αi].







for any b ∈ [bci(0), αi]. By the properties of bci(·) and the assumptions on Fi,
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GFii satisfies the following properties assumed by Maskin and Riley (2000, 2003): (i) G
Fi
i is
twice continuously differentiable; (ii) GFii ’s derivative is strictly positive on [b
ci(aFii ), b
ci(aFii )];
and (iii) GFii (b
ci(aFii )) > 0. Then we can ensure the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium in
the auction stage and apply their characterization results.
We show that in any equilibrium, there is at most one agent who chooses a costly invest-
ment. Consider an arbitrary agent i’s incentive to invest. Take any F−i ∈ F−i, equilibrium
bidding strategies (βF̃ )F̃∈F and optimal ex post investment strategies ã. The ex ante utility
of agent i from choosing F̂i ∈ Fi with γcii (F̂i) > 0 is
UFPAi ((F̂i, F−i), β
(F̂i,F−i), ã)

















Prob{i wins the auction|ai}dF̂i(ai)
where b∗ be the minimum value of the winning bid in this first-price auction. Now let
H ≡ {j ∈ I|bcj(0) ≥ bck(0) ∀k ∈ I} be the set of all agents who have the highest bck(0).
Consider i /∈ H. By the construction of GFkk , the minimum value of the support of
GFkk is b
ck(aFkk ) for any k ∈ I. Therefore, we can apply Proposition 3 of Maskin and Riley
(2000) and Lemma 3 of Maskin and Riley (2003), and obtain b∗ ≥ bci(0).3 Suppose that
UFPAi ((F̂i, F−i), β
(F̂i,F−i), ã) ≥ 0. Then, since ci(ai) > 0 for any ai ∈ (0, αi] and bci(ai) −
ci(ai) = αi − ci(αi) = bci(0) ≤ b∗, i must win with probability one for any ai ∈ (0, αi] and
b∗ = b
ci(0) must hold. But this is a contradiction because if i wins with probability one
for ai with b
ci(ai) < maxk∈I{bck(0)}, some j ∈ H could bid higher and win with a positive
probability.
Next, consider i ∈ H when |H| ≥ 2. By |H| ≥ 2, we have b∗ ≥ bci(0). Since i must win
with probability one for any ai ∈ (0, αi] to have UFPAi ((F̂i, F−i), β(F̂i,F−i), ã) ≥ 0, there is at
most one such agent.
Therefore, we can conclude that in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, there is at most
one agent i ∈ H who chooses ex ante investment F̂i ∈ Fi with [aF̂ii , a
F̂i
i ] ⊆ (0, αi]. And for
any other agent j ∈ I \ {i}, the unique optimal choice of ex ante investment is Fj ∈ Fj
with Fj(0) = 1. Since the tie is broken by the Vickrey tie-breaking rule, agent i wins with
3Lemma 3 of Maskin and Riley (2003) uses a random tie-breaker in the first-price auction, but the proof
goes through for the Vickrey tie-breaking rule as well.
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probability one by bidding maxj∈I\{i}{bcj(0)}.4 And finally, as the optimal choice of agent
i’s ex post investment always maximizes the social welfare, the first-price auction with an
investment game achieves full efficiency in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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